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SECURITIES
OVERVIEW
2
During the past term,' the Tenth Circuit reviewed only three decisions
dealing with the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) 3 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act). 4 The court considered section 12(2), 5 section
13,6 and section 17(a) 7 of the 1933 Act; section 10(b) 8 of the 1934 Act and
rule lOb-5 9 were also discussed. These Tenth Circuit decisions followed wellestablished precedents. An examination of these decisions will, nevertheless,
serve to further clarify the position of the Tenth Circuit on these securities
issues.

I.

SCIENTER AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

In Werthet'm & Co. v. Codding Embgyologt'cal Sciences, Inc.,' 0 the Tenth Circuit reviewed a securities offering of a corporation organized to engage in a
special beef stock promotion. The plaintiff charged violations of section
12(2) and 17(a) of the 1933 Act and noncompliance with section 10(b) of the
1934 Act and rule lOb-5." The trial court found that the defendants had
indeed made material misstatements 12 and a material omission; 1 3 nevertheless, the trial court found for the defendant. In a decision delivered by Judge
McWilliams, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
A.

The Section 10(b) Clatm

The trial court concluded that the misrepresentations and the omission
were the result of mere negligence and that the defendant acted in good
faith. Under Hochfelder, the absence of scienter is fatal to a private damages
action predicated on section 10(b).1 4 Judge McWilliams, noting that one's
1. This survey covers opinions filed from June I, 1979 to May 31, 1980.

2. Wertheim & Co. v. Codding Embryological Sciences, Inc., 620 F.2d 764 (10th Cir.
1980); Cronin v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 619 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1980); and United
States v. Jensen, 608 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1979).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
4. Id. §§ 78a-78kk.
5. Id. § 77/(2).
6. Id § 77m.

7. Id § 77q(a).
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
with the

Id. § 78j(b).

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
620 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1980).
Id.
The defendants had misrepresented the magnitude of the cost overruns in connection
construction of a building. Id. at 766.

13. The defendants also failed to disclose that they had previously engaged in a similar
venture with another company. That enterprise had ended as a financial failure. Moreover,
the defendants were involved in a protracted lawsuit in connection with the prior venture. C.H.
Codding & Sons v. Armour & Co., 404 F.2d I (10th Cir. 1968). The plaintiffs were not informed
of this litigation. 620 F.2d at 766.
14. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Even assuming that the statements
were made with the requisite scienter, the trial court held, in the alternative, that the plaintiffs
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"state of mind almost invariably presents an issue of fact," ruled that the
trial court's negligence finding was not clearly erroneous and hence would
not be disturbed on appeal. 15
The plaintiff urged that reckless misconduct should be deemed the
equivalent of scienter. 16 Judge McWilliams recognized that other circuits
have decided that the reach of scienter includes recklessness, 17 but the judge
concluded that the trial court's determination that the defendant's conduct
was merely negligent precluded such an inquiry in the instant case.18
The Section 12(2) and 17(a) Claims

B.

Acknowledging that a section 12(2) claim survives the lack of scienter,
the Tenth Circuit turned to section 13 of the 1933 Act, which imposes a oneyear statute of limitations commencing "after the discovery of the untrue
statement or omission." The defendant first discovered the misrepresentations in December 1973; the action was not filed until January 1975-one
month too late. Because there was insufficient evidence to toll section 13,
Judge McWilliams dismissed the section 12(2) claim.' 9
On appeal, the plaintiffs did not pursue the section 17(a) claim. At the
trial level, counsel indicated that this claim was included under the umbrella
of rule lob-5. 20 This presents a vivid illustration of how Aaron v. SEC2 1 may
well move the battleground for securities fraud from section 10(b) to section
17(a). That rule lOb-5 has overshadowed section 17(a) in the past is without
question. The implications of Aaron on private damage actions based on
section 17(a), however, may well breathe new life into this anti-fraud provision.

Hochfelder and Aaron both stand for the proposition that the scienter requirement under the anti-fraud sections does not turn upon the identity of
the plaintiff or upon the nature of the relief sought; rather, what is determinative is the language and legislative history of the statutory provision. It
seems, therefore, that this logic allows a private plaintiff seeking money damages to prevail under section 17(a)(2) and (3) without a showing of scienter.
The catch, of course, is that the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether
it will imply a private action under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act. 22 Until the
Court resolves this question, private plaintiffs undoubtedly will pursue section 17(a) claims with much more vigor than they have in the past.
could not show that they had in fact relied on the representations or that they had acted with
due diligence in the transaction. 620 F.2d at 766.
15. Id.

16. The Hochfelder Court refrained from deciding whether reckless behavior was a form of
scienter. 425 U.S. at 193 & 194 n.12.

17.

Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillion & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039

(1978); Sunstrand v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).

18. 620 F.2d at 766-67.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 767.
Id.
100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980).

22. Id. at 1951. For a detailed discussion of the Aaron decision and its possible ramifications, see Aaron v. SEC: The Szinter Requirement in SEC Injunctive Actions, which immediately
follows this overview, inyra at 493.
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II.

BOND COUNSEL AND TRUSTEE'S LIABILITY

Cronin v. Midwestern Oklahoma Development Authorty,23 involved a securities fraud action by purchasers of two issues of industrial development revenue bonds. The bonds went into default, and numerous defendants were
named in the litigation. 24 The purchasers' complaint alleged, in part, that
the bond counsel'and trustee had violated or aided and abetted violations of
rule lOb-5 by failing to disclose certain allegedly material facts. The district
court granted summary judgment to the bond counsel and to the trustee,
and the plaintiffs appealed. Judge Doyle, speaking for the Tenth Circuit
panel, directed the trial court to vacate all of the summary judgment orders.
In essence, Judge Doyle overruled the trial court's decision because the "orders are replete with conclusory statements" and the facts surrounding the
bonds' issuance needed further development. 25 The Tenth Circuit did look,
however, to one legal conclusion of the lower court. The trial court assumed
that since the express fraud was committed by a broker-dealer's sales representative, the purchasers were required to prove that the bond counsel and
the indenture trustee were privy to the misrepresentation. Judge Doyle disagreed. He noted that the defendants would be liable if "shown to have had
participat[ed] in the issuance of the bonds and thus [to have] owed a duty to
all of the buyers to reveal the facts . . . and [liability would also result] if the
defendant-lawyers and banks knowingly aided the underwriter in the issu'26
ance of value-depleted bonds."
III.

BROKER'S FRAUD UNDER SECTION 17(A)

The Tenth Circuit confronted a criminal prosecution based on alleged
violations of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act in United States v. Jensen. 27 The
defendant was the principal operator of a stock brokerage firm called Associated Underwriters (Associated). Associated operated by having an investor
enter into a "conversion investment contract." Under this agreement, Associated would select certain securities, using the investor's funds for the
purchase price. Next, both a "call" option and a "put" option 28 would be
acquired on these securities. As additional protection, the put options were
to be guaranteed by a financially secure institution. Thus, the investors were
promised a fixed return on their investment, not subject to the vagaries of
the stock market.
Associated fell into financial difficulties. One of Associated's customers
defrauded the brokerage house out of $300,000. Many of these stocks were
sold to the investor's accounts at prices far in excess of their fair market
23. 619 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1980).
24. The defendants included: the bond issuer and its officials, the private corporation
which received the bond proceeds, the underwriters, the bond counsel, the indenture trustees,
and the broker-dealers involved in selling the bonds to the plaintiff.
25. 619 F.2d at 862.
26. Id.
27. 608 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1979).
28. The purchaser of a call option has the right to buy stock at a given price. In contrast,
the put option gives one the right to sell a given number of shares of stock, at a specific price,
within a specified time frame.
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value. Moreover, the defendant began to function as the writer of both the
put and call options, as well as becoming the guarantor of the put option,
thus, guaranteeing its own legal obligations. Associated subsequently went
29
bankrupt and left its customers with virtually worthless stock.
On appeal, the defendant, Jensen, argued that there was no sale of the
common stock. Instead, he argued that the investors merely purchased an
investment contract. 30 Judge Logan, speaking for the court, focused on the
legal obligations between the defendant and the investors. Specifically, the
court considered whether Jensen was acting in the capacity of a broker or of
a debtor. The court examined Jensen's representation that the investor's
money would be used to purchase stocks, "which were then placed in the
individual accounts, with each investor being notified." Concluding that
this was essentially a brokerage account, the court held that purchases of
31
stock by brokers are the equivalent of sales to the customers.
The defendant urged that there was no fraud committed within the
meaning of subsections (2) and (3) of section 17(a). Judge Logan rejected
this argument, finding misrepresentations, 32 omissions, 3 3 and a fraudulent
34

course of business.
Finally, Jensen contended that the fraudulent practices did not have the
necessary nexus to the sale of securities. The Tenth Circuit also rejected this
argument, reasoning that "fraud does not have to relate directly to the value
or nature of stock to be a section 17(a) violation. '35 After viewing the transaction as a whole, Judge Logan concluded that if stock was sold, then section
17(a) applies, and if a section 17(a)(2) or (3) fraud was committed at some
point in the transaction, then there was the requisite fraud in the sale of the
36
securities.
Steve M. Skoumal

29. 608 F.2d at 1353.
30. Id.
31. Id.

32. The court noted that, contrary to Jensen's original statements, Associated acted as the
guarantor, with Jensen writing the put and call options on worthless stock. Id. at 1354.
33. The defendant failed to notify the investors of the changed nature of the investment
agreement. Id.
34. Jensen used stock that he knew was essentially worthless, selling it to the investors at
highly inflated prices. Furthermore, he devised a "sham put and call option transaction" and
then guaranteed the put options himself. Id.
35.

Id.

36. Id. at 1354-55.

